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The Russian-American INF Treaty and the Issue of Third Countries
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The Russian-American INF Treaty and the Issue of Third Countries
Annotation
PII
S032120680004152-1-
DOI
10.31857/S032120680004152-1
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Yuriy Nadtochey 
Occupation: Associate Professor
Affiliation: Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University)
Address: Russian Federation, Moscow
Edition
Issue 3
Pages
5-22
Abstract

The article deals with the problems of sustainability of the arms control regime under the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF). Main focus of the study is shifted towards influence of INF Treaty on the position of third countries. In this regard, special attention is paid to the U.S. relations with allies in Europe and Asia, their reaction to the statements of the D. Trump administration regarding intentions to terminate the Treaty. Possible response from Russia and China are also taken to notice, especially in terms of risks that Russian and Chinese counter-measures may pose for the US allies. The article also identifies the prospects for multilateralization of the INF - possible accession of other countries, as well as obstacles to this process. There is an extremely low probability of transforming the INF Treaty into a multilateral document due to the increasing role of non-strategic missile weapons in modern deterrence policy, the demand for weapons of this class by an ever wider range of countries.

Keywords
arms control, non-strategic nuclear weapons, medium and short-range missiles
Received
28.11.2018
Date of publication
13.03.2019
Number of purchasers
89
Views
1960
Readers community rating
0.0 (0 votes)
Previous versions
S032120680004152-1-1 Дата внесения правок в статью - 22.02.2019
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References

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